| On Iran's nuclear ambitions, some have | | | | acquiring deterrent capabilities of their |
| suggested an approach which mirrors our | | | | own. And Israel, which has long seen Iran as |
| policy vis-a-vis N. Korea. In other words, if | | | | a serious threat, might decide to strike |
| they really insist on the need for a peaceful | | | | preemptively, as it did against Iraq in 1981. |
| nuclear infrastructure, then the world should | | | | |
| help them build nuclear power plants which do | | | | To prevent such a dangerous spiral, Iran's |
| not produce the kind of nuclear byproduct | | | | nuclear weapons development must be halted. |
| which can be used to produce nuclear weapons. | | | | It is not enough that Tehran sign on to the |
| The trouble is N. Korea and Iran clearly have | | | | Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, as it has |
| ambitions of possessing nuclear weapons. In | | | | done. Nor is it sufficient only to allow |
| fact, most experts believe Pyongyang already | | | | additional inspections by the IAEA. |
| has several such weapons in its inventory. | | | | |
| This approach, nonetheless, may be worth | | | | As long as Iran has the inherent capability |
| pursuing with Iran - if only to call Tehran's | | | | to produce nuclear weapons materials, be it |
| bluff. So far, however, the U.S. and | | | | by enriching uranium or reprocessing |
| Europeans continue to pursue this issue in | | | | plutonium, it will have the option of |
| the UN context. | | | | following in the footsteps of North Koreas |
| | | | withdrawing from the nonproliferation treaty, |
| In this regard, many experts believe this | | | | ousting the inspectors and finishing a bomb. |
| close collaboration to steer Iran away from | | | | |
| its nuclear weapons program may pay off. The | | | | Only when the key weapons-material-production |
| following Feb. 24, 2004 article from the | | | | parts of the nuclear fuel cycle have been |
| International Herald Tribune lays out this | | | | dismantled and destroyed can there be any |
| argument well and succinctly: | | | | confidence that Tehran will not become a |
| | | | nuclear power. |
| Early next month, the International Atomic | | | | |
| Energy Agency's board of directors will once | | | | Europeans and Americans agree on this goal. |
| again meet to consider how to respond to new | | | | Now they need to agree on a common strategy |
| evidence that Iran has continued to hide | | | | to get there. |
| significant elements of its nuclear program. | | | | |
| Although the board may agree to refer the | | | | The first step must be an agreement to refer |
| issue to the UN Security Council, the United | | | | the issue to the Security Council, which |
| States and Europe still differ on how best to | | | | should warn Iran that its continued failure |
| respond to Tehran's continuing violation of | | | | to fulfill all its nonproliferation |
| its nonproliferation obligations. | | | | obligations constitutes a threat to |
| | | | international peace and security. |
| The trans-Atlantic partners urgently need to | | | | |
| coalesce around a long-term strategy for | | | | Next, the United States and Europe should |
| confronting Iran. Such agreement is needed to | | | | agree on a common strategy that combines |
| effectively deter Iranian violations and to | | | | Europe's preference for carrots with |
| keep the prospect of a diplomatic resolution | | | | America's preference for sticks. They have to |
| open. | | | | agree on a clear set of benchmarks and |
| | | | deadlines for Iran to give up its enrichment |
| It is needed for a second reason too: This | | | | and reprocessing capabilities. Tehran's |
| dispute has all the makings of repeating the | | | | compliance would lead to the economic and |
| disastrous fissures that developed over Iraq, | | | | technology cooperation that European leaders |
| except this time Britain appears to be siding | | | | promised last fall. |
| with its European partners against the United | | | | |
| States. That would be tragic for many | | | | At the same time, the United States and |
| reasons, not least because in this particular | | | | Europe would have to draw red lines that |
| case there is absolutely no difference | | | | Tehran could not cross. And they would have |
| between the two sides on the ultimate | | | | to reach a clear understanding on the kinds |
| objective. | | | | of coercive actions they would take in the |
| | | | event of further noncompliance from economic |
| Everyone, Europe and the United States as | | | | sanctions through, ultimately, the |
| well as Australia, Canada, Japan and even | | | | destruction by force of Iranian nuclear |
| Russia, knows that the consequences of Iran | | | | facilities. |
| becoming a nuclear power are exceedingly | | | | |
| grave. | | | | The high costs of U.S.-European disagreement |
| | | | over how to deal with Iran are all too |
| Tehran's long-range missiles would put much | | | | obvious. It should not be beyond the |
| of Europe within reach of a possible nuclear | | | | capability of U.S. and European diplomats to |
| strike. Neighboring states might respond by | | | | forge a common strategy. |