| On Iran's nuclear ambitions, some have suggested an | | | | deterrent capabilities of their own. And Israel, which |
| approach which mirrors our policy vis-a-vis N. Korea. | | | | has long seen Iran as a serious threat, might decide |
| In other words, if they really insist on the need for a | | | | to strike preemptively, as it did against Iraq in 1981. |
| peaceful nuclear infrastructure, then the world should | | | | To prevent such a dangerous spiral, Iran's nuclear |
| help them build nuclear power plants which do not | | | | weapons development must be halted. It is not |
| produce the kind of nuclear byproduct which can be | | | | enough that Tehran sign on to the Nuclear |
| used to produce nuclear weapons. The trouble is N. | | | | Nonproliferation Treaty, as it has done. Nor is it |
| Korea and Iran clearly have ambitions of possessing | | | | sufficient only to allow additional inspections by the |
| nuclear weapons. In fact, most experts believe | | | | IAEA. |
| Pyongyang already has several such weapons in its | | | | As long as Iran has the inherent capability to produce |
| inventory. This approach, nonetheless, may be worth | | | | nuclear weapons materials, be it by enriching uranium |
| pursuing with Iran - if only to call Tehran's bluff. So | | | | or reprocessing plutonium, it will have the option of |
| far, however, the U.S. and Europeans continue to | | | | following in the footsteps of North Koreas |
| pursue this issue in the UN context. | | | | withdrawing from the nonproliferation treaty, ousting |
| In this regard, many experts believe this close | | | | the inspectors and finishing a bomb. |
| collaboration to steer Iran away from its nuclear | | | | Only when the key weapons-material-production |
| weapons program may pay off. The following Feb. | | | | parts of the nuclear fuel cycle have been dismantled |
| 24, 2004 article from the International Herald Tribune | | | | and destroyed can there be any confidence that |
| lays out this argument well and succinctly: | | | | Tehran will not become a nuclear power. |
| Early next month, the International Atomic Energy | | | | Europeans and Americans agree on this goal. Now |
| Agency's board of directors will once again meet to | | | | they need to agree on a common strategy to get |
| consider how to respond to new evidence that Iran | | | | there. |
| has continued to hide significant elements of its | | | | The first step must be an agreement to refer the |
| nuclear program. Although the board may agree to | | | | issue to the Security Council, which should warn Iran |
| refer the issue to the UN Security Council, the United | | | | that its continued failure to fulfill all its nonproliferation |
| States and Europe still differ on how best to respond | | | | obligations constitutes a threat to international peace |
| to Tehran's continuing violation of its nonproliferation | | | | and security. |
| obligations. | | | | Next, the United States and Europe should agree on |
| The trans-Atlantic partners urgently need to coalesce | | | | a common strategy that combines Europe's |
| around a long-term strategy for confronting Iran. | | | | preference for carrots with America's preference for |
| Such agreement is needed to effectively deter | | | | sticks. They have to agree on a clear set of |
| Iranian violations and to keep the prospect of a | | | | benchmarks and deadlines for Iran to give up its |
| diplomatic resolution open. | | | | enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. Tehran's |
| It is needed for a second reason too: This dispute | | | | compliance would lead to the economic and |
| has all the makings of repeating the disastrous | | | | technology cooperation that European leaders |
| fissures that developed over Iraq, except this time | | | | promised last fall. |
| Britain appears to be siding with its European partners | | | | At the same time, the United States and Europe |
| against the United States. That would be tragic for | | | | would have to draw red lines that Tehran could not |
| many reasons, not least because in this particular | | | | cross. And they would have to reach a clear |
| case there is absolutely no difference between the | | | | understanding on the kinds of coercive actions they |
| two sides on the ultimate objective. | | | | would take in the event of further noncompliance |
| Everyone, Europe and the United States as well as | | | | from economic sanctions through, ultimately, the |
| Australia, Canada, Japan and even Russia, knows that | | | | destruction by force of Iranian nuclear facilities. |
| the consequences of Iran becoming a nuclear power | | | | The high costs of U.S.-European disagreement over |
| are exceedingly grave. | | | | how to deal with Iran are all too obvious. It should |
| Tehran's long-range missiles would put much of | | | | not be beyond the capability of U.S. and European |
| Europe within reach of a possible nuclear strike. | | | | diplomats to forge a common strategy. |
| Neighboring states might respond by acquiring | | | | |